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WORKMEN'S COMPENSATION
I. INJURIES ARISNG OUT OF EMPLOYMENT
To sustain an award under the South Carolina Workmen's
Compensation Law,' it must appear that the injury or death re-
sulted from an accident "arising out of and in the course of the
employment."' LaMott v. City of West Columbia3 dealt solely
with the question of whether the deceased was acting in the
course of employment at the time of his death. George LaMott,
Jr., a member of the West Columbia Fire Department and Rescue
Squad, drowned in Lake Murray while helping to recover a sun-
ken racing boat and the body of its driver. At the time of the
incident, LaMott was on a two-week vacation, but as an em-
ployee of the West Columbia Fire Department he was subject to
call whether on or off duty, and even when on vacation if still in
town. However, while off duty he was not required to respond to
fire or rescue alarms unless requested to do so.
LaMott was not requested to come to the fire station but
nevertheless voluntarily accompanied several other off-duty em-
ployees to Lake Murray to assist in the search. There were no
facts indicating an urgent need for his assistance. The Industrial
Commission denied the application of LaMott's beneficiaries for
workmen's compensation benefits, but the court of common pleas
reversed and granted the benefits.
In reinstating the decision of the Industrial Commission, the
supreme court found this case within the general rule that an
employee while on vacation is not protected by the Workmen's
Compensation Law.' LaMott's death did not arise out of and in
the course of his employment because he was performing no duty
or obligation of his employment at the time of his death. The
court distinguished the cases of Compton v. Town of Iva5 and
1. S.C. CODE ANN. § 72-1 et seq. (1962).
2. Id. § 72-14 provides in part: "'Injury' and 'personal injury' shall mean only injury
by accident arising out of and in the course of the employment ..
3. 193 S.E.2d 592 (S.C. 1972).
4. See Williams v. City of Columbia, 218 S.C. 287, 62 S.E.2d 469 (1950).
5. 256 S.C. 35, 180 S.E.2d 645 (1971). Compton concerned the death of an off-duty
police officer who, pursuant to the custom of the town, volunteered to aid a highway
patrolman in investigating a disturbance. The policeman was killed in a head-on auto
collision following the investigation.
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Walker v. City of Columbia6 in which the court had reached a
different result with off-duty police officers. These cases, the
court pointed out, concerned situations from which it could rea-
sonably be inferred that the officers were engaged in authorized
law enforcement at the time of their accidents. Their activities
arose from conditions of their employment, and the accidents
were therefore held to have arisen out of their employment. The
court decided that LaMott's death "did not result from any duty,
obligation, or condition of the employment, but was a purely
voluntary and gratuitous effort."7
As a general rule an injury sustained by an employee while
on his way to or from work and away from the premises of the
employer does not arise out of and in the course of employment.
There are, however, certain recognized exceptions to this rule.8 In
Bickley v. South Carolina Electric & Gas Co.,' the supreme court
introduced another exception, "the special errand rule."1 Many
courts have recognized this exception and have allowed compen-
sation when injury was sustained by an employee while perform-
6. 247 S.C. 241, 146 S.E.2d 856 (1966). Walker involved an off-duty policeman who
died of a heart attack while assisting a fellow officer in making an arrest. A strong consid-
eration here was the fact that the police rules and regulations, obedience to which was a
condition of employment, required Walker to respond at all times to aid a fellow officer.
7. 193 S.E.2d at 593 (S.C. 1972).
8. Sola v. Sunny Slope Farms, 244 S.C. 6, 14, 135 S.E.2d 321, 326 (1964), listed the
exceptions as follows:
(1) Where, in going to and returning from work, the means of transportation is
provided by the employer, or the time that is consumed is paid for or included
in the wages; (2) Where the employee, on his way to or from his work, is still
charged with some duty or task in connection with his employment; (3) The way
used is inherently dangerous and is either (a) the exclusive way of ingress and
egress to and from his work; or (b) constructed and maintained by the employer;
or (4) That such injury incurred by a workman in the course of his travel to his
place of work and not on the premises of his employer but in close proximity
thereto is not compensable unless the place of injury was brought within the
scope of employment by an express or implied requirement in the contract of
employment of its use by the servant in going to and coming from his work.
9. 192 S.E.2d 866 (S.C. 1972).
10. 1 A. LARSON, THE LAW OF WORKMEN'S COMPENSATION § 16.10 (1952) defines the
special errand rule as follows:
When an employee, having identifiable time and space limits on his employ-
ment, makes an off premises journey which would normally not be covered
under the usual going and coming rule, the journey may be brought within the
course of employment by the fact that the trouble and time of making the
journey, or the special inconvenience, hazard, or urgency of making it in the
particular circumstances, is itself sufficiently substantial to be viewed as an
integral part of the service itself.
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ing a special task, service, mission, or errand for his employer,
even before or after customary working hours or on a day on which
he did not ordinarily work.'"
Collins Bickley was an apprentice lineman employed by the
defendant and usually worked in the Columbia area. Although
his normal work week consisted of forty hours, he was subject to
being called for emergency work outside the regular period of his
employment. Early on the morning of November 3, 1969, he and
other members of his crew were called upon to repair storm dam-
age to the defendant's electrical lines in Charleston. They worked
until late that night and then returned to their Columbia work-
site. On his way home from the worksite, Bickley collided with a
truck and was killed.
The Commissioner determined that Bickley's death did not
arise in the course of his employment but rather that the
employer-employee relationship ceased when Bickley left the
place of his employment to return home. The full Commission
upheld this decision, but the court of common pleas reversed on
the basis of a "special mission." The supreme court, in affirming
the lower court, quoted from a North Carolina case, Massey v.
Board of Education:"
An exception to the aforesaid general rule is found in cases
where it is shown that the employee, although not at his regular
place of employment, even before or after customary working
hours, is doing, is on his way home after performing, or on the
way from his home to perform, some special service or errand
or the discharge of some duty incidental to the nature of his
employment in the interest of, or under direction of, his em-
ployer. In such cases, an injury arising en route from the home
to the place where the work is performed, or from the place of
performance of the work to the home, is considered as arising
out of and in the course of the employment.' 3
II. EMPLOYER-EMPLOYEE RELATIONSHIP
Corollo v. S.S. Kresge Co."' concerned the question of
whether the plaintiff, an employee of the defendant's licensee,
11. 99 C.J.S. Workmen's Compensation § 234d (1958).
12. 204 N.C. 193, 167 S.E. 695 (1933).
13. 192 S.E,2d at 869-70, quoting from 204 N.C. at 197, 167 S.E.2d at 697.
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was an employee of the defendant for workmen's compensation
purposes. The plaintiff was employed by Benjamin Kraft & Sons,
Inc., a company licensed to manage the millinery section of the
defendant's K-Mart department store in Columbia. In a work-
related fall she sustained painful and perhaps permanently disa-
bling injuries. Although she made a claim for and was paid work-
men's compensation benefits on behalf of Kraft, she brought a
common law tort action against Kresge in federal district court.
Verdict was for the plaintiff,'" and Kresge appealed to the Fourth
Circuit Court of Appeals.
The circuit court had to decide whether the South Carolina
Workmen's Compensation Law constituted a bar to this tort ac-
tion. The defendant contended that it was an "owner" within the
meaning of section 72-111 of the South Carolina Code.16 Kresge
also asserted that the plaintiff was its "statutory employee" and
therefore limited to the exclusive remedy of the Workmen's Com-
pensation Law as provided by section 72-121 of the Code.'7
The court decided that the issue was controlled by Adams v.
Davison-Paxon Co.,'8 a case with a nearly indistinguishable fac-
tual situation in which no tort recovery was allowed. The court
rejected the plaintiffs argument that the degree of control neces-
sary to create a master-servant relationship between Kresge and
herself should also be necessary to create the statutory employer-
15. This case was tried twice resulting in verdicts for the plaintiff both times. In the
first trial the jury awarded $10,000, but the judge set this aside as "grossly inadequate"
and ordered a new trial. The second trial resulted in a $20,000 verdict and the defendant
appealed to the circuit court.
16. S.C. CODE ANN. § 72-111 (1962) provides as follows:
When any person, in this section . . . referred to as "owner," undertakes to
perform or execute any work which is a part of his trade, business or occupation
and contracts with any other person (in this section. . . referred to as "subcon-
tractor") for the execution or performance by or under such subcontractor of the
whole or any part of the work undertaken by such owner, the owner shall be
liable to pay to any workman employed in the work any compensation under
this Title which he would have been liable to pay if the workman had been
immediately employed by him.
17. Id. § 72-121 provides as follows:
The rights and remedies granted by this Title to an employee when he and his
employer have accepted the provisions of this Title, respectively, to pay and
accept compensation on account of personal injury or death by accident, shall
exclude all other rights and remedies of such employee, his personal representa-
tive, parents, dependents or next of kin as against his employer, at common law
or otherwise, on account of such injury, loss of service or death.
18. 230 S.C. 532, 96 S.E.2d 566 (1957).
1973]
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employee relationship for workmen's compensation benefits.'9
Instead, the court said that when work done by the subcontractor
was a part of the owner's general business, the employees of the
subcontractor were statutory employees of the owner even though
their immediate employer was the independent contractor.2 The
court had little difficulty in finding that Kraft's millinery busi-
ness was part of the business of Kresge-that of operating a "one-
stop shopping center." The court stated: "That the agreement
with Kraft for the operation of the millinery department did not
remove that department from the scope of K-Mart's 'trade, busi-
ness or occupation' as those terms are used in the statute is...
clear."'" Thus, the court concluded that the workmen's compen-
sation statutes barred the plaintiff from maintaining the tort ac-
tion and limited her to a workmen's compensation award.
III. RECIPIENTS OF BENEFITS
The supreme court in Flemon v. Dickert-Keowee, Inc. ,22 had
to determine who was entitled to the workmen's compensation
benefits of the deceased, John R. Flemon. Flemon was an unmar-
ried man survived by numerous next of kin and also by three
acknowledged illegitimate children. The state circuit court held
in accordance with the hearing Commissioner that the three ille-
gitimate children should receive the benefits as dependents of the
deceased.
Evidence indicated that the deceased had contributed only
irregularly and insubstantially to the support of these children.
The next of kin maintained that the illegitimate children, al-
though acknowledged, were not dependents entitled to work-
men's compensation benefits absent proof of their having been
supported by Flemon. Although for workmen's compensation
purposes "child" is defined as including an "acknowledged illegi-
timate child dependent upon the deceased," 3 section 72-161 of
19. See Marchbanks v. Duke Power Co., 190 S.C. 336, 2 S.E.2d 825 (1939).
20. MacMullen v. South Carolina Elec. & Gas Co., 312 F.2d 662 (4th Cir. 1963);
Bridges v. Wyandotte Worsted Co., 243 S.C. 1, 132 S.E.2d 18 (1963).
21. 456 F.2d at 310 (4th Cir. 1972).
22. 259 S.C. 99, 190 S.E.2d 751 (1972).
23. S.C. COD ANN. § 72-6 (1962) provides in part:
The term "child" shall include a posthumous child, a child legally adopted prior
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the Code undermines this definition by stating that "a child shall
be conclusively presumed to be wholly dependent for support on
a deceased employee."24
Because South Carolina modeled its Workmen's Compensa-
tion Law after that of North Carolina,"5 decisions interpreting the
North Carolina statute are weighed heavily in this state .2 The
North Carolina case of Lippard v. Southeastern Express Co.,27
decided just before South Carolina adopted its Workmen's Com-
pensation Law, construed the statute to allow illegitimate chil-
dren to receive benefits in an almost identical situation, stating:
The dependency which the statute recognizes as the basis of the
right of the child to compensation grows out of the relationship,
which in itself imposes upon the father the duty to support the
child, and confers upon the child the right to support by its
father. The status of the child, social or legal, is immaterial.2
The South Carolina Supreme Court, which had adopted the
Lippard rationale previously, 9 again found no reason to interpret
the statute any differently. The court based its decision on the
fact that the Workmen's Compensation Law is "remedial legisla-
tion which is entitled to a liberal construction in order to accom-
plish the ends and purposes for which it was enacted."3 Public
policy thus militated in favor of paying the benefits to the three
illegitimate children in order to uphold one of the primary pur-
poses of workmen's compensation-preventing injured employees
or their dependents from becoming charges of society.
IV. JUDICIAL REVIEW
In Davis v. McAfee Manufacturing Co.,3' the supreme court
affirmed the long standing principle that in workmen's compen-
sation cases the Industrial Commission is the fact finding body.
dependent upon the deceased, but does not include married children unless
wholly dependent upon him.
24. Id. § 72-161.
25. N.C. GEN. STAT. §§ 97-1 et seq. (1972).
26. See, e.g., McDowell v. Stilley Plywood Co., 210 S.C. 173, 41 S.E.2d 872 (1947);
Fuller v. South Carolina Tax Comm'n, 128 S.C. 14, 121 S.E. 478 (1924).
27. 207 N.C. 507, 177 S.E. 801 (1935).
28. Id. at 509, 177 S.E. at 802.
29. Barr's Next of Kin v. Cherokee, Inc., 220 S.C. 447, 68 S.E.2d 440 (1951).
30. 259 S.C. at 104, 190 S.E.2d at 753 (1972).
31. 259 S.C. 433, 192 S.E.2d 328 (1972).
1973]
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In an appeal from the Commission, the court is limited to the
determination of whether there was competent evidence to justify
the Commission's factual findings. Only where the evidence sup-
ports one possible inference is the matter a question of law for the
court to decide.32
RONALD P. JOHNSON
32. Arnold v. Benjamin Booth Co., 257 S.C. 337, 185 S.E.2d 830 (1971).
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